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UNSTEADY AERODYNAMIC CHARACTERIZATION OF
A MILITARY AIRCRAFT IN VERTICAL OUSTS
A. Le Bozec AMD-BA I and J. Cocquerez IMFLZ
1 - INTRODUCTION
	 L*
The study of aircraft behavior in atmospheric turbulence 	 I
generally covers several areas which are significantly
	
r
I:
interrelated: unsteady aerodynamics, structure dynamics, flying
	 f:
qualities, and piloting. r
The impact of turbulence on the flight of a military aircraft
is one of the factors limiting operational use; it is essentially
linked to pilot fatigue conditions and to a decrease in platform
stability.
For the new generation of aircraft equipped with overall
automatic_ control„ a direct and optimum action with respect to
the effects of turbulence has been sought since these aircraft
were conceived.
This process requires that the unsteady aerodynamic effects
resulting from turbulence be recognized and modeled in order to
have a tool to predict and improve aircraft behavior.
For this report, the IMFL and the AMD -BA, working closely
together, have developed experiments to characterize the unsteady
aerodynamics of military aircraft in vertical gusts.
These experiments involved an existing model, well defined
elsewhere.
*Numbers in the margin indicate pagination in the foreign text.
1Research organization, expansion unknown.
2Research organization, expansion unknown.
4
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Following a brief review of the experimental method developed
to establish a data base, we present the methods of analysis and
aerodynamic characterization used, as well as the principal
results obtained.
2 - PRINCIPLES AND EXPERIMENTAL METHOD	 ,i3
2.1 - Basic principles - physical similarity
The experiments on a free model are based on the Froude
similarity (maintaining the ratio of inertia forces to gravity
forces) which allows a similar representation of the trajectory
and movement of the aircraft. The variables of the problem are
expressed as a function of these primary independent values:
gauge length, volumetric mass of the environment, and gravitational
acceleration. The principal physical values, their "size," and
object-model similarity ratios are presented in Figure 2.
This similarity is limited since, from an aerodynamic point
of view, it cannot simultaneously represent the identities of the
Reynolds and Mach numbers. We note also that tests on free
models relate only to the area of incompressible subsonic flight.
In addition, the use of large models makes it possible to reach
Reynolds numbers, calculated on the average chord of the blade,
in the neighborhood of 2.3 x 106.
The concept of gust response tests is established using an
indirect similarity process. The tests on a model constitute
experimental support for validating a mathematical model which
represents the phenomena. The conditions for the model and for
free flights are adapted on a trial-and-error basis.
5
2.2 - Model and instrumentation
Figure 3 presents a general view of the model used in this
work. It is a permeable model of the Mirage 2000 scaled at
1/8.6. The internal and external elevens are interdependent.
The nose-tip is kept at 0° during all the experiments. The basic
centering is 52%.
The model is instrumented to allow, by means of PCM
telemetry, recovery of motion dynamics, recovery of positions and
attitudes, and determination of aerodynamic values: local kinetic
pressure, incidence, and sideslip via an anemoclinometric probe
placed on the furthest forward point and used to measure the
gust.
The model's equipment includes (Figure 4):
- 5 accelerometers Z AV, Z AR, Y AV, Y AR, X
- 1 lateral gyrometer p
- 1 anemoclinometric probe linked to 3 pressure transducers
(local kinetic pressure, incidence, sideslip)
- 1 coder-transmitter unit, PCM mode, 30 measuring tracks
- 1 cell for acquisition initialization and space-time
synchronization
- 1 scanner for measuring the initial drop velocity
- 3 reference points for trajectory calculation
- internal powerpacks.
The accelerometers used are limited accelerometers with a
frequency in excess of 800 Hz.
The pyrometer acts as a second level, with cut-off frequency
of 45 Hz and absorption coefficient of 0.8.
6
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The pressure transducers have their own frequency of
5000 Hz. The low-pass filters are interposed before coding and
emission. The longitudinal parameters (Z AV, 2 AH, (probe) are
low-pass filtered, cut-off frequency 150 Hz, fourth level with
the goal of avoiding scale-folding problems caused by the
sampling. The signals from the transducers are coded in PCM mode
at 12 bits, the frequency of the coder is 150 kbits/second, and
30 measuring tracks are available. Each parameter appears twice
in the cycle, which corresponds to a sampling period of 1.28 ms
(781 Hz).
2.3 - Vertical gust generator (Figure 5)
The vertical gust generator occupies at maximum the volume
left free by the lateral wind tunnel. It generates a stream
semi-guided by the two lateral return corridors; the working
section of the stream, located 2 m above ground, is 2.75 m high,
3.30 m wide, and 2.5 m long. It is inclined 4° from the vertical
to minimize the X component.
Three longitudinally distributed profiles of vertical
velocity were created for these tests (Figure 6): one of window
type, one of rising gradient type, and one of descending gradient
type. These three types of profiles allow us to test the
influence that frequency distribution at the entrance has on
model response. The maximum velocity for each profile is 2.5
m/s, which makes it possible to obtain a variation of incidence
compatible with the hypotheses of linearity of the model, while
allowing for the model velocity (35 m/s). These profiles were
formed through the use of flow distribution grates placed in the
blowing and auction chambers.
The profiles of gust types are identified by three series
of velocity measurements taken with a micro-windmill in three
parallel planes, situated on the flight symmetry axis and 0.25 m
7
to either side of the axis, at a height corresponding to the
average passing altitude of the model in the wind tunnni. The
repeatability and the stability of the gust over time have been
verified, which guarantees that the gust crossed during the test
conforms to the gust prtvio •.esl.y measured.
2.4 - Catapulted flight test station
In the general view of the testing installation (Figure 7),
it is possible to distinguish the zone where wind velocity is
increased and decreased using a pneumatic catapult, the free
flight area where trajectories can be developed over the
approximately 30 m of distance covered, and the model recovery
zone. In the free flight area, the vertical gust generator makes
it possible to create exterior stresses (incidence) on a length
of 2.5 m.
The methods chosen for catapulting the model make it possible
to obtain precise initial drop conditions, especially with
respect to geometry, kinetics, dynamics (vibratory and
instrumental aspects) and aerodynamics.
The initial longitudinal velocity at the time of drop is
clearly defined using scanning barriers.
The data necessary for determining the trajectory and 	 L
attitudes of the model in flight are obtained on three ground
bases equipped with banks of scanners. Each base is situated in
a vertical plane normal to the flight symmetry plane and includes
two optical recording banks with photographic plates at
perpendicular axes. Each base thus records the luminous
reference trails made by the model, as well as a fixed local
reference. The trails are picked up continuously. Pre-
programmed triggered flashes make a freeze-frame of the model on
8
each photographic plate and activate a photocell on the model.
This photocell generates space-time synchronization data inserted
in the PCM telemetry cycle.
2.6 - Software for interpreting test results (Figure 8)
Two principal programs are used to process free flight data:
- a trajectory calculation program processes the luminous
spatial reference trails made by the model., using data
obtained by processing scanner recordings from the bases.
From this are obtained the Euler angles, the center of
gravity coordinates, and the velocity vector orientation
for each base.
- a program for processing the telemetry data uses the values
obtained from the difference between free flight and zero
readings made under the catapult immediately before
velocity is increased. The first unit of initial
conditions is determined either by direct measurements
(instantaneous values furnished by the transducers at the
time of velocity drop) or by independent measurements
(slope, attitudes, initial velocity, etc.).
The results obtained from these two independent sources of L
information are then used in a test for validating data and for
final adjustment of the initial flight conditions. Trajectory
calculation data remain the most precise and make it possible to
establish points of coincidence with the integrated dynamic data.
Flights are valid when, for each variable, the coincidence occurs
inside the "precision tubes" defined by the geometric values.
Adjustments are made to the initial conditions of the flight (^,
e, 01 X, Y, Z, first and second derivatives), taking into account
the confidence interval of each parameter.
9
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Elsewhere, the IMFL is pursuing the development of another
recovery method based on Kalman filtering.
3 - METHODS OF RESULT , .r",NALYSIS AND AERODYNAMIC
CHARACTBRIZATION
3.1 - Research of impulse responses (AMD-BA)
I
Stationary coefficients, it appears, are absolutely not
adaptable to modeling an aircraft penetrating a gust ( Figure 9).
The moment of pitch is even opposite in sign to that which
i
occurs in reality.
i
The standard methods of unsteady representation, developed
especially at IMFL and based on dividing the aircraft into
forward fuselage, wing, and tail section, give good results for
civil aircraft but seemed to us to be poorly adapted for a delta
wing.
This is why Avions Marcel Dassault has continued to use
research on impulse responses as a method of aerodynamic
characterization for a military aircraft penetrating a gust.
Once the impulse responses are defined, any type of gust can
be considered the sum of impulses. If the aerodynamic phenomena
are linear, the aircraft response to any type of gust will be the
sum of the impulse responses, the integrals of which are the
indicative responses.
The hypothesis of linearity is justified by the range of
	
10
low incidences in practice.
The aircraft behavior can be characterized by a transfer
function H (p) - (Figure 10).
10
P: Laplace variable
t:	 time variable
E q) N ( )	 SCp)
or a Ck)
	
p	 or a (!')
input = gust	 output = aircraft response
Remember that the functions F(p) and y(t) are relinked in the
equation by the Laplace transformation. 000000
;,dF^^) = ^ 
^(F) e ^rdt^
On the other hand, it is possible to write:
S (P) = R( p )	 E(P)
or	 s(t) = h(t) # e(t)
designates a convolution product.
In the case of vertical gusts, as the observed transversal
moments in the tests are slight:
- sideslip /'3 < 16
- lateral attitude 0 < 5°
only the longitudinal components Cm and Cz are of interest.
Thus it can be written:
CZ(`) = CZ„	 + CZ-1-1(f) t
Cam, (^) = G.+o	4.	 C
	
9 CE) +
coefficients
	
unknown
	 dynamic coef.
measured at	 constant	 linked to
time t	 coef.	 unknown pitch
velocity
11
Czd (F) *^(E)
uniknown	 \incidence
unsteady	 measured at
coef,	 time t
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Some authors propose the following representation:
G.CA-) m Cza + Cc, ► 9(F) + C36t (F) * a (6)
Ck, c O M, Cwo .4. C" ^ 9 CF)	 CV-.1 W * 01 C^)
We have not used this representation in the present case,
because pitching velocity changes little in the gust.
To explain the convolution produLt, the following is used:
C z (^) = C M o ♦ Cz 9	 + ! C, C-r). •t
VA
o
and to refine it:
CL
	
a Cw` o + C% 9, 9 (4) + ^- CMOI,; . bC ^ f ..^ T^As to
This leads ultimately tc. resolution of the matrix equation:
matrix of
measured
"angles of
incidence"
A (n,p + 3)
IAX = B^\
matrix of
	 ' matrix of
unknown	 measured
coefficients	 coefficients
X (p + 3, 2)
	 B (n, 2)
3.2 - IMFL Method of "local" coefficient identification	 L12
To study C . A.G. [expansion unknown] linked to free model
testa involving crossings of short wave - length vertical gusts,
the IMFL has systematically developed and is developing
mathematical models for representing phenomena based on dividing
the model into several sections. This method makes it possible
to allow for the distribution of aerodynamic incidence on the
aircraft.
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For a model subjected to a gust of short length with respect
to the length of the model, the profile of the vertict.-i
velocities is not uniform along the model. This statciaent leads
to the consideration not of one single incidence, calculated at
the model's center of gravity, but of a family of local
incidences which makes it possible to allow for and to represent
the rapidly variable aspect of the phenomenon. These local
incidences are calculated at the geometric centers of the various
sections (Figure 11).
3.2.1 - Model choice and equations
The hypotheses used for the remainder of the calculation are
the following;
- the model is an unchangeable solid;
- the movement of the model is longitudinal;
- the gust is contained in the XOZ vertical plane, the
symmetric plane of the model;
- the velocity of the model is constant in the module;
- all angles are considered small;
- the gust is permanent (stable during the time the model.
takes to cross the gust).
Longitudinal movement is described by the equations for lift
and moment of pitch.
Projection on dza
eSV C:
moment around the center of gravity
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The coefficients Cz and Cm are linearized with respect to
incidence
Cw (E) a Cwo +	 CZa . • d,: (E^
summation extended to all control points where
local incidences are calculated.
4.
with Ca b incidence with the ground calculated at the CDQ
variation of the incidence introduced by the
vertical gust, calculated at point i by applying a
V	 pure delay to the value measured by the
l
anemoclinometric probe.
9V
F	
influence of the pitching velocity
The local coefficients Czo< and Cm,,,/,^ are a result of
minimizing an object model distance criterion by least squares:
r /. L
Vie coefficients thus identified are then introduced into the
simulation.
3.2.2 - Si mulation model
Using the formulated hypotheses, the longitudinal movement
equations are written,:
v	 v
3d
= z Q se,i C ( G,,^^ 2^)9 + C,' d .^r} C.,a +G.- Y^
9 2+ CIF
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The matrix form of the differential system is thus written:
with:	
X -
	
A	 LA
	
 
\	
)
- - P 5 Z CJ A Q,;	 .L P 5 Cw,^
II A II =	
D
''	 y	 v
3.3 - Choice of analysis parameters	 15
This essentially concerns incidence. Three values are
available:
°ground = ground incidence:
O^	 a(	 +':ground V
This is the angle made by the
aircraft velocity vector and the
horizontal fuselage reference.
These angles are of no interest for
the unsteady aspect.
pressure measurement incidence
	
where	 w: gust velocity derived from pressure
measurement.
	
and
	 V: aircraft velocity
probe: incidence measured by the probe
15
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The intensity of the gust, expressed asACz and Q Cm, varies
with regard to pressure measurement incidence between tests
conducted with the same gust. These differences are clearly more
than measurement error.
On the other hand, a clear correlation is observed between
the Cz and Cm effects of the gust and the probe incidence. This
implies use of the latter for calculating impulse responses
(Figure 12).
4 - VERIFICATION OF GUST DETECTION PROBES
4.1 - Behavior outside the gust
The first tests made with a spherical probe revealed a noise
problem affecting incidence measurement. Analysis showed;
- that it was not a handling problem, as the noise also
appeared on the electric signal.
- that it was white noise.
- that it was not electrical in origin. While the
transducers are being set at zero, before increasing
velocity, the signal does have the noise.
- that the increase of fluctuations with velocity during the
acceleration phase on the launch ramp resembles aerodynamic
noise (Figure 13).
Explaining the crest-crest incidence deviations of 1.6°
requires velocity variations of 0.9 m/s; these are incompatible
with "at rest" air conditions in a turbulence-free laboratory.
The conclusion is thus reached that the constant noise is
definitely linked to the geometry of the probe.
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A series of tests conducted at the CEAT S4 wind tunnel
confirmed our conclusions and led us to adopt a probe with
conical geometry ( Gruson probe), the desired gain being
approximately 2 (Figure 14).
Upon retesting in free flight, our expectations were 	 L
surpassed. The fluctuations were brought to d of '^ 0.3° crest-
crest.
4.2 - Behavior in the gust
Teats for measuring probe response time were conducted at
Chalais, Meudon. This dynamic standardization, which constitutes
the identification of the internal dynamic response of the probe
(entire unit - piping - transducer case - transducer), has no
bearing on establishing the flow on the probe. For the Gruson
probe, the delay taken into account for velocity and incidence
signals is 3 ms (1 me pure delay and 2 ms to climb to 10%).
In the unit, the comparison of probe incidence and pressure
measurement incidences is quite good on window gusts, with,
however, small deviations on the plateau value ( 0.4° max.). On
the ramps, more significant deviations on the maximum values are
noted ( Figure 15). However, past records show that probe
velocity increases about 1 m/s as the gust passes.
To solve these problems, work was done to characterize the
overall dynamic behavior of the probes (aerodynamic aspect).
5 - PRESENTATION OF PRINCIPAL RESULTS	 18
5.1 - Steady aspect
5.1.1 - Correlation with wind tunnel results
A catapulted flight with a gust includes four stages:
17
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- one phase to lessen the transitory effects of the ramp (of
no interest for this study);
- one phase of passage through the gust;
- two phases of quasi-permanent flight: one before and one
after the gust (Figure 16).
The interest in these two last phases concerns the degree of
credibility of the measurements made, in comparison to results
obtained in other wind tunnels.
It can be confirmed (Figure 17) that values are similiar for:
- the lift gradient
- the polar curve opening
- the position of the center
The Fauga results, which stand out, are perfectly explained
by the influence of the Reynolds number.
The wind tunnel curves are reset based upon the null lift
values (C xo ^ W„ O ) o(o) of the free flight. These parameters are
a function of the mounting and especially the permeability of the
model.
5.1.2 - Repeatability
Another credibility criterion for the measurements made
concerns the repeatability of results; as every experimenter
knows, two experiments reputed to be identical do not always give
the same results.
From this point of view, the following can be considered
satisfied:
18
dd '! ± 0.'1S°
AA balance N ±p,^°
(Figure 18)
These values were obtained by constantly improving test
procedures, as well as by more specific concentration on elevon
rigidity and precision of aileron display; this last parameter is
very noticeable for an aircraft with delta wings.
5.2 - Unsteady aspect
5.2.1 - Impulse method (AMD-BA)
The unsteady results are themselves encouraging, as the
indicative responses converge well on the steady gradients in
most cases ( Figure 19).
However, there is still some noise, and identification in the
case of some flights gives unsatisfactory results;
- significant oscillations ( Figure 20)
- non-convergence
An investigation of these problems is under way, in
particular with respect to the impact of structural noises,
behavior of gust detection ( probe), etc.
5.2.2 - Sectional method (IMF L)
The results presented in Figures 21 and 22, comparing the Cz
and Cm obtained in flight to those obtained in simulation with an
19
overall model (one section) or a model in sections, require the
following remarks:
- the overall model, as predicted, does not follow real
behavior, especially in pitching response;
- with a model cut into 14 sections, behavior in pitching-
pumping is very well restored.
During its development, this method was the subject of
additional studies which make it possible to identify especially:
the effect of the number of sections, the eventual physical
significance of the coefficients, and the durability of the model
with regard to various gust entrances.
6 - GENERAL DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVES
The experimental method is proven to be well adapted for
unsteady aerodynamic characterization in vertical gusts.
The need for the launched probe to take gust intensity into
account in the various analysis methods indicates that more
complete verification is necessary, especially in dynamics.
The balanced characteristics are heightened beginning with
flights outside of gusts, which constitutes a given reference
with respect to wind tunnel results.
From an unsteady point of view, the first results are
satisfactory. The development perspectives presented for
analysis methods and aerodynamic characterization are encouraging
and give rise to the necessary investigations.
20
On the bases presently established, it is possible to
simulate an aircraft ' s behavior in turbulence given its design.
This makes it possible to envision treatment of problems
concerning behavior optimization through the concept of
generalized automatic control.
21
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A major factor in selection of the Lockheed team was the fully
integrated management structure that established clear relationships
between the organizational elements of the Shuttle Processing
Contractor and the work to be performed. Lines of communication,
authority, and responsibility were directly drawn between top
management and the organizational elements. Personnel of other team
members--particularly Grumman--were (and are) integrated throughout
the organization, along with the functional assignment of Vandenberg
Air Force Base operations to Morton-Thiokol, Integrated Ground
Operations to Grumman, and Program Requirements Analysis to Pan Am.
With the transition period approximately at the half-way point, it	 j
is too early to reach any definitive judgment as to the operational
effectiveness of the emerging organization. However, it is possible
to identify certain features or principles of the Lockheed plan that
indicates a recognition of the challenges and problems in both the
near and longer-term. For example:
--A recognition, as stressed by the SPC's top management,
that maintenance and well-being of the work force is essential to
productive and safe operations. High morale among employees and
attention to detail must be sustained for the operational life of
the space transportation system, no matter how routine and
predictable operations become in the later years.
--Creation of an external Safety Advisory Board (modeled in
many respects after the ASAP) that will meet at least quarterly
to examine all aspects of the SPC's operations from a safety
perspective. Direct access to SPC top management is assured.
The desirability of direct communication between this new Safety
Advisory Board and the Panel was informally discussed in
December.
--Recognition of the need for a common logistics system to
support operations at both Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg
Air Force Base. SPC management currently views logistics as its
most serious and difficult problem. This responsibility is
17
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hampered by NASA's own ambiguity concerning a total logistics,
spares, and maintenance program. The SPC has no responsibility
for ordering or budgeting spares acquisition. It is also not
SPC's responsibility to plan major or minor maintenance
"downtime" for Orbiter refurbishment. This must be ,.esolved if
the logistics system is to adequately support operations.
--An expressed determination to drive operating decisions to
the lowest possible level in order to (1) strengthen
responsibility at the hands -on level and ( 2) take advantage of
the expertise and knowledge of those persons actually doing the
work. Day-to - Day instructions are not to come from top
management.
--Recognition of the lack of commonality among the Orbiters
and the related assumption that maintenance and logistics
procedures must take these differences into account for the life
of the program.
--The decision to work toward zone-type processing of the
Orbiter where a particular area is worked completely and
closed-out only once, as distinct from the present system of
numerous close-outs as individua l systems are processed
separately. Related to this approach is the objective of
assembling all needed instructions and parts in the immediate
location or station where the work is to be performed.
--Establishment of direct links between thy , SPC's planning
organizations- -Program Requirements Analysis, Mission Management
Office, and Software Integration Office- -with comparable Level
III entities at NASA. These direct communication channels will
facilitate technical expertise being readily available and
provide channels of information for NASA to observe element
performance and share in the decisions to further simplify
"turnaround" procedures.
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These various organizational arrangements and operating
principles will be monitored by the Panel as they are
implemented. Nevertheless, they provide evidence at this
juncture of a management approach that appreciates the continuing
risks and difficulties of Shuttle processing, as well as the
opportunities to develop a more efficient and cost-effective
operation.
NASA'S Support of the Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC)
In prior annual reports and in other reports to NASA
management, the Panel has emphasized the importance of moving
toward an organizational arrangement within NASA that takes
account of the special needs of the Shuttle's routine, more
nearly commercial type, operation as distinguished from the prior
research and development effort. In July 1982 we noted, for
example, that a "well-defined and stable organization within NASA
to oversee STS operations is the anchor for the SPC." The
selection of the SPC and initiation of its responsibilities makes
	 )
this observation more timely and pertinent than ever.
Last year the Panel suggested that the "organizational
arrangement within NASA that is to be responsible for commerical
operation of the Shuttle should be determined and announced, even
though full implementation of this arrang,:gent might not be
feasible for the next several years." The Panel's assessment of
the current status of the Shuttle Processing Contractor indicates
why this recommendation still merits consideration. For example:
--The interim logistics procedure now in effect essentially
continues control of all flight hardware with Johnson Space
Center and Marshall Space Flight Center. While this arrangement
is appropriate for the immediate period when the SPC is building
its capabilities and establishing a confidence level among NASA
managers, the time is fast approaching when retention of this
control by research and development centers will more than likely
19
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impede processing operations. Planning should begin now for an
orderly transfer of this oversight responsibility within NASA to
an STS operations entity.
--A comprehensive maintenance plan for the Orbiter is
lacking. NASA's Operations and Maintenance Instructions (OMI's)
provide maintenance procedures but not a baseline from which
risks can be assessed. Preparation of such a plan would
undoubtedly be a priority-assignment of an STS operations entity,
carried out in collaboration with Johnson Space Center, Marshall
ipace Flight Center and the new Shuttle Processing Contractor.
--Operational problems of some magnitude can be expected for
the SPC once the Vandenberg launch facility is activated. For
example, conflicts between NASA and the USAF for priority of
spare parts and perhaps ground support equipment will have to be
resolved if the SPC is to carry out its processing
responsibilities on both coasts. Resolution of these problems
will be facilitated by the existence of an STS operations entity
within NASA.
--Flight schedules at KSC and VAFB should be established that
permit the SPC to deploy its nu-an and material resources in a
cost-effective manner.
--The SPC should participate in the review process that leads
to major hardware acquisitions and enhancements that relate to
Shuttle processing activities.
The Panel is encouraged by the approach and apparent
organizational and technical capabilities of the SPC. The
preparation for this significant step toward achieving a genuine
operational space transportation system has been thorough and
sensibly carried out. Both NASA and the Lockheed team, along
20
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with the incumbent contractors, have contributed to this
generally positive situation. As noted above, however, the Panel
will continue to monitor these activities as the SPC assumes its
full responsibilities and as the flight rate accelerates.
0
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continuing concern for the structural integrity of the Orbiter at
its full payload capability and we are following NASA's flight
planning to assure ourselves that adequate placards are in place
until the structural loads and strength capability have all been
defined.
Other Issues
Automatic entry and automatic braking:
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel accepts NASA's response
that a complete automatic reentry implies many change in ground
control concepts and manual inhibit responsibilities for the
crew, and the Panel agrees that the likelihood of incapacitation
of the entire crew is remote. Such a response does not cover the
more detailed suggestion that automatic gear deployment and
auto-braking should be considered to provide redundancy at a
critical time.
Role of crew vs. ground control:
NASA response indicates progress toward more autonomous crew
responsibilities and the ASAP commends such efforts. Separating
the various segments of the operation into launch, on orbit and
entry is useful in analyzing crew responsibilities and should be
continued. The ASAP included one other phase in its discussions
and that was the phase of flight readiness prior to launch. It
is the Panel's suggestion that some simplification in procedures,
some added confidence in on-board instrumentation, and some time
saved might be possible if the cockpit were used as a major
readiness check station in much the same manner as the cockpit of
a complex airliner or combat aircraft is used.
25
W-t- 'ter_:.. .. ..
p	 ^
a,
W0
rigure 11
rINDINO LOCAL COBr1'ICIENTS
q
— -
	
a cd0.._ 
O
N.1 a. = a cdq + w, /V — q.l , /V
c
n
a
rwi, gust
Cz(t) = Cz + ICz .a (t)
m	 m°	 i m^i i
J 
J = I(CZ(t) -- (Cz + JCZ .a, (t)) 2j M
	
m°	 mO i 1
Cz a
 , Cm a.
1	 1
I i
nq..,.	 aim
ANGLE OF INCIDENCE CHOICE
SENSOR INCIDENCE
Figure 12
' PRESSURE MEASUREMENT INCIDENCE
i
ACz
N
^01!" eion
•	 in Cz///*• A
Aa
0.4°
ACz
• i
.•
•	 Aa
mimmmo
0.40
 .
ACm
N
precisioni
O
O
••	 in Cm
INPUT OUST
Cm
d
• ^`i	 a' at
48
^ a
O O
OUTPUT OUST
•
window
* increasing elope
A decreasing slope
•	 W
s
^• L
Figure 13
m	
°I
to
^	 y	 I	 I
•	 i
N
4r
d'd{.
4O
a
iw
to
t.
a
..	 ti
m	 m
0
F	 ,yyt¢	 oa	 m
^	
u	
pp
•moo	^	 O O
N	 N	 C
a	 m	 .r
z	 0 m
to	 o	 a
N	
a	 wV1	 p
P7	 V	
4+
4	 ^
N	 A	 ++	 7	
.^
co
N	 •"	 ^	 .d
0	
V	
A
0
"
	
4j 4a
v	 m
q	 G L	 U
a	 '" d	 •"
0	 N
=-,.
	
_...__ _.	
.=;.,gym-,-
	 -.ma=r•	
,.:_
AaZZ::0.3°
60
time
Figure 14
SENSOR BEHAVIOR OUTSIDE OUST
i
spherical probe
(1 probe
Aa
80	 crest to crest
60 "	
Aa2 10 .
	
0 OMMMM
	
o
time
	 5	 10	 15 a
free flight
	 I
	
wind tunnel
conical probe
Ip a Probe
JQQ
crest to crest
DRIGINAL PAGE IS
DOOR QUAJ.ITy
.0.5 •-e-+
5	 10 15 a
Figure 16
0
EOIOI	 n
-14
0
oz
0
a
CL.	 Ld
0
E
O
o	
S/W
z
O
is P,
8 ,	 1A$
09ai
Figure 16
• v d
4I
M
V
d
b
d G
W •p M ta
O
^ 4
a
W A\
n jj(to
7
v •v
w •^ r	 1
a a
O
it t
a
4j
W
a I
•
4
n
. a
^ H a atB cx
O
a o
m to O 00
°o TMa w ,,,
pp
INC
a a
~
o e
O
0 -IH
L
^+
E
V!
H
.• o Figure 17
y co
`
• 
-
`
•
`
•
^
y iV	 ^.
G \`•;
w
P4
y !
3 N
O
Om
0
O
N
d
O
p	 t0y
q	 •\r
H
LO	 V
momN
ai
D
r„
0
x
3
E
kq
C7
M
W
C7
d
LD
u
er
d
v
A
m
.O
i
•
•
N	
n 	 /.firm	 ^
N	 07	 ^^	 Q
y	 `	 1
	
m o
	
•^
1.4
	
n
E
00
Q T
r11
V
^^	 •z
•
VJ
°"w `. m
nom. '• ^ a
.JY
	
^•
••	 O
O
O
N
P T'fi
^.. '}'I
Q
/N
V
W
Cd rvp^
u
M
W
W
d
O
V
'Od
u.
a(^	 r}111ati X^I^J .^I.....'.LM
Nr
V)
E
w
CD
M
a
w
0
.y
a+
E
M
►i
M
CA
^QE
W
a
as
w
z
z
m
n
a
•	 E
p,
M
-	 a
i
1
Gi V	 M
c7 a
00
md
e
0
0
a
e
d
V
v
N
N
O
a
8
H
d
0
a
N
v
4
v
m
a
a
a
M
O
EV
Figure 19
J.
o	 a,
V	 V
b
dM0
1\
U
1
04MW
H
' N
0.
0
a
G1
.N
^
45,
4 ^ V
M 7 8 , N
r ^
`I1 '
3
1 \
NN
U c U
i
i
H
RaN
a
•
Fa
^.py
d 0
O
ay0. GiiO O.
Figure 20
to
1
^,	 I
OF	 a	 /
r r r,	 N
n
,y.
4•
Figure 21
N
N
b O
n A
b0 O O
',q O N
r+444 4 Wv d O
44i i N
G 4
vn
E
N
E
O
Of
zH
°a d
MOOE
c7 W
N o 0e
NE•
Ri
a
a..^=.^.^:^:sir..r,-;...;«Y_...^-..:.:._.::'3'r.•,
	
-	 '^.,'^.-.. .^.z:••. x:	 _--.a...c.--aaxr.^w:aes^-»mec.._a...cr-a'+cc+^aave.^mmm^r¢v .vR-:.':--,sae
Figure 22
dp
M
ti
It'.
C7 Oow
00
H
a
a
Y
C
C
T
E
N
co
C7
A
V
E
Lti
D
i
d b
•0 0
^^ a
eo a o
•M O •N
r•1 •N M
W Y ^
d m 0
O ^ ^
r
Appendix 4
EXTRAVEHICULAR ACTIVITY
Suits and prebreathinq
Extravehicular activity (EVA) is increasing as the STS
project reaches out with new and more sophisticated programs.
All EVA has been conducted to date using a 4.3 psi suit. As far
as the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is aware, all EVA
activities have been routine except for the first flight. The
current suit, because of its low operating pressure, requires an
extensive period of prebreathing of 1008 oxygen (up to 4 hours)
prior to attempting an EVA from a 14.7 psia cabin. This
precaution is necessary to avoid decompression sickness (bends)
of astronauts when going EVA.
On mission 41-B (STS-11) the cabin pressure will be reduced
from the normal 14.7 psia to 10.2 psia before initiating EVA to
acclimate the astronauts to the lower pressure. This allows
prebreathing time be reduced to about 40 minutes as well as
decreasing the astronaut's susceptibility to decompression
	 `.
sickness.
For the future, research is being conducted on a higher
operating pressure suit at 8+ psi. This new suit design is to
have much greater flexibility in the shoulder, arm, and leg
joints, than that of the current suit. The new design has the
capability of greatly reducing or eliminating prebreathing
requirements.
It is the view of Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel that as
time progresses there will be an increasing need for the higher
pressure more flexible suit. While current NASA plans may not
require this new design, we can visualize the increasing need for
it as missions become more complex and the Air Force begins to
36
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use the STS for its own missions. The ability to go EVA with
little or no prebreathing is a big plus. The greater flexibility
of the new design when combined with the proven torso of the
existing design should decrease workload of the astronaut and
reduce his susceptibility to decompression sickness.
We believe that NASA should foster the full development of
the higher pressure suit and when fully tested it should become
the standard suit for all future EVA activities.
Manned maneuvering unit
This short range versatile spacecraft, the manned maneuvering
unit (MMU), has been conceived for use as a controllable platform
which can transport an astronaut on a short radius from the
Orbiter payload bay to satellites near the Orbiter or to inspect
the external surfaces of the Orbiter itself. The purpose for the
transportation of the astronaut is to place a member of the crew
in a position to inspect, repair, and help retrieve satellites
whose orbits can be reached by the Shuttle. Sufficient control
power is designed into the MMU to permit the passenger astronaut
to use the thrusters on the MMU for controlling the motion of
randomly moving satellites and to tow them back to the Shuttle
for repair or return to earth.
The concept of the MMU and its systems, along with the
operational plans and developed capabilities, was reviewed by an
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel member at the contractor's plant
(Martin—Marietta in Denver, Colorado). In addition, the
simulator work, the facility, and the training program were also
described and shown. Simulator training was assessed along with
methods for coupling the astronaut to the Solar Maximum Mission
(SMM) satellite. Similarly, the adapter hardware and procedure
r	 for attaching the MMU to the payload bay wall was viewed as part
G
of the total description of how the "space—suited" astronaut
37
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mounted the vehicle, detached it from the payload bay wall and
reattached it once the mission was completed.
From this individual but thorough review, the Panel notes:
a. The concepts of redundancy for critical systems are
consistent, the systems are simple and sufficiently
exposed to permit thorough inspection.
b. The cold gas thrust and attitude control system is
susceptible to pre-use inspection prior to
disengagement from the Shuttle bay wall.
C.	 The gauge indicating energy available to the
x
thrusters was in a poor position for visual
monitoring while the astronaut was secured in the
unit's seat. It seemed feasible to move this gauge
without destroying the integrity of the systems
tests that have been run.
d. The training program has been developed
pragmatically along with the unit and appears to be
effective.	 After the first experimental flight
with the MMU this program and the formal
documentation should be reviewed again by the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel.
e. It was determined that no "safety" umbilical
(tether) is to be used for the first experimental
flights and is not contemplated for ultimate
operatioanl use. This appeared to introduce
unnecessary risk, but the astronaut
trainer-director for the program explained that
umbilical tangling and snagging represented a
hazard judged to be equally severe and that the
thruster system of the MMU did not have enough
38
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capacity, even if stuck in "full thrust", to move
the passenger out of range of the Shuttle
capability for astronaut rescue. Additionally, the
"buddy system" provides that a second astronaut in
the regular EVA suit will be there.
Based on discussions at the MMU Critical Design
Review Yield November 1983 an additional comment can
be made: If, for any reason, there are significant
amounts of dust/debris in the payload bay during
ground or flight operations, care should be
exercised to prevent MMU pneumatic systems from
being contaminated which might adversely affect
their operation.
a
F
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Appendix 5
LOGISTICS, MAINTENANCE, SPARES AND OPERATIONS
This discussion is based on three specific activities: (1)
General Abrahamson's meeting at Kennedy Space Center in November
1982, (2) attendance at a logistics telecon at Rockwell
International, Downey, California, in April 1983, (3) visit to
Vandenberg Air Force Base in October 1983. In addition, major
events have occurred during 1983 which have direct bearing upon
the subject:
a. Creation of the Integrated Logistics Panel (ILP)
and commencement of working liaison with Vandenberg
AFB. This is noted in a Program Directive, SSPM
No. 85A issued by JSC's NSTS Office, March 25,
1983.
b. Issuance of an Integrated Logistics Support Policy
(ILSP) for the National Space Transportation System
establishing a platform for (a) above.
C.
	
The award to Lockheed of the Space Shuttle
Processing Contract (SPC).
The meeting at Kennedy Space Center convened by Gen.
Abrahamson on November 9, 1982 was the catalyst for the more
vigorous logistics, maintenance and support activities which have
gradually evolved during 1983.
The Integrated Logistics Support Policy is commendably
detailed with seven appendices: Management policy, spares
policy, maintenance and repair policy, logistics support
functions policy, ILS milestones, ILS definitions and ILS top
level documentation tree. It would appear that a number of
management level people in both NASA and USAF are looking to the
establishment of the Lockheed-managed SPC as a partial answer to
40
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many logistics problems but, although the ILSP was produced
concurrently with the contractor-selection award process, the
directive does not cite an SPC role in this arena. It is too
early to be able to gauge the effect of the SPC program upon
logistics but clearly it must necessarily be heavily involved, at
both KSC and VAFB.
With respect to the scope of the ILP task, there is concern
that it does not include logistics for the Spacelab, Centaur, IUS
and PAM elements. It certainly appears that only a complete
system ILS program, that is, including the vital payload
elements, would have the desirable result of ensuring that the
k	 vehicle launch dates can be met from the support viewpoint.
The issue raised by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel in
earlier annual reports, namely, that of providing logistics
control by a single entity appears to remain for the future. The
cooperation and growing cohesion of the USAF-Vandenberg and the
NASA-JSC/KSC elements is very encouraging but the co-chairing
arrangements of the ILP, necessary as they may be at present, do
not make for efficient operation in trying to recover some of the
critical time lost over the past three years.	
Y'
The task of the ILP is greatly complicated by the necessity
of trying to match the USAF well-developed organizational and
management systems with the equally well-established
"three-level" system at NASA. This results in a number of
organizational "wiring diagrams," interface and procedural
documents, few of which, at this writing appear to be completed.
While the issues of supply of components at the line
replaceable units (LRU) level appear to be documented and
r	 understood some of the necessary suppliers may not be funded.
Progress is most certainly being made in detail components but
major units such as the SSME with its critical sub-assemblies
i
still are in need of a good, clearly established master plan.
41
There is also the logistics aspects of transporting the SRB
segments to VAFB which are in need of reinforcement for which the
case for a third set of rail cars is being made.
Storage space at KSC for SRB segments is limited (although
VAFB seems to be better off in this respect) and there is clearly
a need for a study involving a "transportation model" to resolve
some of these issues before they become a trans-continental
transport crisis. In this general context the critical
dependency upon only one B-747 Shuttle ferry vehicle for
coast-to-coast movement should be re-examined.
Based upon our observed development of the logistics spectrum
over the past year it appears that:
a. Considerable progress has been made in trying to
gain control of the logistics problem.
Improvements in NASA's interest and organization
for Integrated Logistics System and sincere	 a
cooperation and coordination by USAF for the 	
4
projected VAFB operations are certainly showing
results.
d
b. There still appears to be issues associated with
who has the responsibility for Orbiter, that is to
say between the USAF and NASA. (The Directive says
that the Air Force has responsibility for it
"on-orbit." This needs clarification.)
C.	 The "reporting to" functions of the Integrated
Logistics Panel (ILP) are still unclear. Should,
for example, the ILP report directly to the
National Space Transportation System Program
Office? Should the ILP functions also embrace
logistics aspects of operation and launch instead
of being limited as at present to supply and
42
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support tasks? The charter of the ILP, in spite of
well-written directives from NASA Headquarters and
Johnson Space Center is still unclear.
d. Considerable worry has been voiced throughout the
year about the lack of ILP access to the Spacelab,
Centaur, Inerital Upper Stage, and Payload Assist
Module systems and the question therefore arises:
is the ILP intended only to support Shuttle and not
the broad spectrum of NSTS which would include
these payloads?
e. The USAF view seems to be that they can't see
anything in the NASA system at present which could
be recognized as a well-developed maintenance,
supply and logistics curriculum such as the USAF
have developed and refined over the years. On the
other hand, it appears that the evolving NASA
logistics programs are more suited to the special
problems of the small Orbiter fleet than the
highly-structured, large fleet concepts of the
USAF. Providing a workable accommodation between
these two opposing philosophies would seem to be a
pre-requisite for the ILP but it must be empowered
by directive to be able to bring about such a
foundation.
f. The "co-chairing" of the ILP by USAF and NASA is
clearly the only arrangement which could be
employed at this stage. Perhaps it is too early to
establish the function of an overall "czar" of
logistics but the difficulties which are beginning
to show up from this rather too democratic
co-chairing process could probably be
short-circuited by the early appointment of a
strong top chief with total authority.
g.	 The role of the SPC in the entire scheme of things
needs to be determined and made visible to all
concerned as soon as possible if some of the
program's aspirations are to be realized.
l
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Appendix 6
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ELEMENTS
Orbiter Landing Speed and Pitch Control
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel has, in the past, called
attention to major deficiences in handling qualities of the
Orbiter. These deficiencies are well known, highlighted by
substantial pitch gyrations during the Approach and Landing Test
No. 5 and some subsequent landings. Such control perturbations
have been examined by analysis and numerous simulator control
explorations. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel believes that
NASA top management should direct further exploration of the
significant benefits to be gained by major changes to improve the
pitch control of the Orbiter.
The latest information that the ASAP has found on this
problem is a report of the flight control system testing done on
the Ames Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS), entitled: "Evaluation
of the Space Shuttle Approach and Landing Flight Control System
Handling Qualities" by S. D. Griggs, R. J. Grabe, and S. R.
Nagel. This study, carefully conducted over a period of several
months, by competent engineers and pilots with extensive
experience in high performance airplanes and Shuttle simulations,
resulted in the following recommendations:
a. Do not replace the current Flight Control System with any
of the alternate systems evaluated. Some were found to be
slightly better, but not to the extent that a change to the
u
	 baseline system is warranted.
A
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b. Investigate the feasibility of improving the low speed
handling qualities of the Orbiter through airframe modifications,
such as the addition of canard surfaces.
Eight different flight control systems were evaluated
including software modifications to filters, gains, feedback
paths, senor, etc. Ten pilots flew approaches to runways
simulating Dakar, Kennedy Space Center, and Edwards Air Force
Base. Disturbances were introduced during the approaches to
stimulate transients in sensor data, such as changes in radar
altitude, in azimuth from the microwave landing system, head/tail
winds, and reduced visibilit y return as in a breakout from low
cloud deck. The Heads Up Display (HUD) was not used.
The results show substantial variations in touchdown point,
airspeed at touchdown, and vertical speed at touchdown (h).
Different software "improvements" failed to show significant
changes; -- and there were a number of "crashes". A "crash" is
defined as landing short or long or left or ryht or with h
greater than 10 fps.
Pilot comments on the baseline system were:
"Easy to balloon under stress"
"If aircraft disturbed, end up hunting for ground"
"Cannot control aircraft precisely near ground"
"Lag between rotational hand controller (RHC) and
vehicle response causes over control for large inputs
and undercontrol for small inputs."
These comments on the performance of the recommended system
indicate that there is a basic pitch control problem in the
aerodynamic design of the Orbiter.
r
It appears that the attempt to combine pitch and roll control
with lift augmentation by the use of elevons on a delta wing
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results in compromises that have penalized both pitch control and
lift augmentation.
The pitch control problem arises from the fact that, on the
landing flare, to reduce airspeed, the pitch up moment is
,accomplished on the Orbiter by raising the elevons which
inherently decreases lift coefficient with loss of lift,
increasing the landing speed. The loss of lift is in response to
a control motion that a pilot normally uses to raise the nose and
increase lift! In addition, the inertia of the Orbiter is such
that the motion of the c.g. lags the control input by as much as
two seconds. The lag and apparent lift reversal can induce over
control, and, in some cases, severe pilot induced oscillation
(PIO) .
The use of canard surfaces to provide pitch control would
free the elevons to be used for lift augmentation and roll
control.	 The elevons would have to be limited in droop to
maintain adequate roll power but in spite of this, the available
increase in lift would be most significant. Estimating from a
nominal landing speed of 1751 knots, angle of attack of 100,
elevon angle of 0 0 , produces an apparent lift coefficient of
0.41. Using the elevons as landing flaps with a canard trimmer
might produce double this lift coefficient with a possible
landing speed of 125 knots.
The above increase in lift coefficient is not impractical.
The advantages of such a landing velocity reduction are very
significant from a safety viewpoint:
a. Stresses on wheels and brakes are reduced
b. The risks of landing at Dakar or other short fields are
reduced, opening up many alternate abort sites
C.	 In the event of ditching in the open sea, the
probability of survival would be greatly enhanced.
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one of the significant findings in the Ames Vertical Motion
simulator tests was an appreciation of the dangers of attempting
a high-weight low-speed landing (like an abort to Dakar). If the
angle of attack is increased much above 100, in an attempt to
land slowly, the aerodynamic condition is one of "backside of the
L/D curve" where the induced drag rapidly decelerates the orbiter
and increases the sink speed.
In addition to the safety aspects of low landing speeds, the
avoidance of pilot induced oscillation must be emphasized. To
the non-pilot, the term "pilot induced oscillation" is just that:
a disturbance that is felt to be controllable and transient. To
the pilots who have experienced it, including the astronauts, it
is recognized as a potentially uncontrollable instability. The
lack of a landing incident to date is a trtoiite to the skills of
the astronauts, and to the carefully planned and executed
training program in high performance aircraft, the Shuttle
Training Aircraft, and simulators.
I
Space Shuttle Main Engine
The current year began unauspiciously for the Space Shuttle
Main Engine (SSME) with the discovery of leaks in the STS-6
engines and the resultant delays in scheduled flights. There
were a number of intensive reviews of the problems and their
systems and management implications. Panel members participated
in several of these reviews. Corrective actions were devised and
implemented. Subsequently, the engines performed essentially as
predicted in all the flights this year. During the STS-8 flight
an Augmented Spark Igniter line failed during the shutdown
sequence. This had no effect on the mission. The cause of this
failure has been identified and corrective action implemented.
Because of the very limited life (one or two flights)
demonstrated by the turbomachinery during t;•^ FPL (109%)
certification test program and in the absence of near-term
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flights requiring that thrust level, it was decided to limit
planned flights to 1048 thrust. Such "derating" is a prudent
step. Not only does it provide added operating margin for the
SSME, it also should result in longer useable life for the
turbomachinery. This should mitigate the logistical problems
that would be caused by the need for frequent change-out of
turbopumps that are operated at 1098.
The SSME project has embarked on a three-phase program to
achieve a long-lived, reliable full power loaf (FPL) engine. The
first phase involves conducting certification extension tests at
1048 to obtain more data on durability at that thrust level. The
second phase comprises the orderly development, certification and
incorporation of a set of design-detail modifications aimed at
solving some of the problems encountered with the current FPL
design. The third phase includes major redesign changes. Among
them are: Redesign of the Hot Gas Manifold to eliminate
non-uniform flows and accompanying parasitic pressure losses;
elimination of injector baffles and shields, and increasing the
throat diameter of the nozzle. All of these changes will tend to
"unload" the turbomachinery thus providing greater operating
margins and, hopefully, extended useful life. Also included in
the plan are steps to provide new turbopump designs should the
preceding not prove effective.
The Panel supports this organized approach to solving the
problems of the SSME. Such a program is necessary to provide a
reliable engine for higher-power operation and to reduce the
logistic burden of frequent component removals.
The Panel would like to emphasize that it is important to set
the objectives of this improvement program in terms of
demonstrated margins of stresses, temperatures, loads, etc.,
rather than primarily in terms of time at a given thrust level.
Stipulating margins gives recognition to the fact that
time-to-failure curves are extremely sensitive to stress,
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temperature, etc., in the vicinity of the ultimate stress limits
of materials. This is especially true when materials are
operated at the high temperatures that prevail in the SSME.
Having demonstrated such improved margins by, among other
things, operating the engine at thrust levels above 1098 it is of
utmost importance to not fall into the trap of considering the
engine to be "rated" for operation at the higher thrust level.
What has been accomplished is to have demonstrated that there is
a margin for operation at 1098. To operate at the highest level
tested would be, in essence, to operate without margin.
The Panel will continue to monitor the progress in the
program during the coming year.
Orbiter Structural Integrity
t	 The Orbiter structure was designed to loads that have
acquired the name	 "ASKA 5.1." A later set of loads	 (now called ^•
"ASKA 5.4"),	 based on revised aerodynamic and thermodynamic data,
.1
was used for the most current structural assessment. 	 Flight data
analyzed to date	 (strain gage readings recorded on flights STS-1
through STS-5)	 have not shown reasonable agreement with predicted
strain for the same locations using ASKA 5.4 leads. 	 Even though
these	 initial	 flights were designed to be as benign as possible,
the ASKA 5.4 predicted limit strain on the wing alone was
exceeded in:
a. 63 instances during ascent
b. 41 instances during descent
Fortunately, there were no instances where the measured
strain exceeded a safe allowable limit strain. The numerous
exceedances of ASKA 5.4 predicted limit strains without exceeding
safe limit strains could be due to:
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a. the ASKA 5.1 loads that were used for design were
more severe than the ASKA 5.4 used for assessment
in the areas where exceedances were measured
b. larger than minimum margins of safety were accepted
and used in the design.
Since flight development was officially concluded with STS-5,
the development flight instrumentation installed in OV-102 has
essentially been dismantled. There does not seem to be an
adequate plan to acquire the in-flight data required to close out
the discrepancies between flight and analysis data. T!.arefore,
the following steps should be taken:
a. Vehicle OV-102, which was the most densely
instrumented vehicle, should have all DFI
(Development Flight Instrumentation) gages
reactivated and duplicated on both sides of the
vehicle and should have adequate pressure
	 j
measurements added in order to establish a more
complete data base.
b. The initial flights were designed to be as benign
	
	 +
I"
as possible. With the flight envelope being
expanded with each flight, instrumentation should
be required on all vehicles in order to safely
monitor future flights.
The failure of flight data to validate the current best
predictions of structural loads raises serious questions about
how the full strength of the Orbiter vehicles can be safely
exploited. The Panel views the present situation as follows:
a.	 ASKA 5.4 loads apparently do not have the correct
distribution of aerodynamic forces in the ascent
configuration.
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b.	 Current analytical prediction of internal loads and
identification of the most critical elements for
structural failures are not valid.
C.	 OV-103, OV-104 and OV-105 wing structure will be
more critical than earlier vehicles because of the
800 pounds of structural weight removed in a weight
reduction program. The reduction was based on
adhering to close margins on ASKA 5.4 loads which,
in some areas, were less than the ASKA 5.1 loads
used for the original design. Thus, the failure to
validate the ASKA 5.4 _.oads has particular
significance for these later vehicles.
d.	 Future plans include missions that can experience
118 more dynamic pressure (Q) on ascent and 608
higher heating rate on descent than has occurred on
STS-1 through STS-5. The best way to prepare to
I
safely fly the most severe mission should be
addressed.
Vehicle 6.0 Loads/Stress Analysis
Since the time that the ASKA 5.4 loads were derived (in
1976/1977), both flight and wind tunnel data have been developed
that should provide a better basis for generating loads that more
closely represent those being experienced by the full-scale
flight vehicles. It has been proposed that a new set of loads be
derived and used with an updated finite element model to provide
a basis for establishing safe structural limits for future
flights. This proposed effort has been called the 6.0 Vehicle
Loads/Stress Analysis.
The vehicle 6.0 loads/stress analysis would consist of a
complete update of the dynamic, thermal and mechanical loads math
models that takes into consideration all structural configuration
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changes resulting from the OV-103 weight saving efforts and other
Shuttle element (ET and SRB) modifications. The followng should
also be re-evaluated: aeroheating and thermal gradients,
aerodynamic and compartment venting pressure loads, weight
distributions, inertia loads, ascent trajectories, and the
effects of the redesigned landing gear metering pin. These
efforts should be coordinated with the latest wind tunnel and
flight test data results in order to establish a new internal
loads data base for ascent, descent, and landing conditions.
These loads would then be used as a basis for a new stress
analysis to establish the operational capability of the vehicle.
The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel believes that another
round of loads analysis of the 6.0 type is necessary in order to
safely utilize the full potential of the Orbiter structure.
Filament Wound Case (FWC) For Solid Rocket Boosters
Results of a full-scale hydrotest of two segments of the FWC
were reported at the Technical Interchange Meeting at Morton
Thiokol, Wasatch Division, on November 16-17, 1983. Full-scale
test specimens TFS 2 and TFS 3 were pinned together with proper
end closures and external tank/solid rocket booster interfaces
and successfully completed hydrotesting on October 21. The test
results are as follows:
a. The test ran four maximum expected operating
pressure (MEOP) cycles to 1050 psi with a final
test to 1478 psi without burst.
b. The fiber strength in TFS 3 was demonstrated to 442
KSI.
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C.	 The factors of safety (F.S) were shown to be:
1.50 Factor of Safety in the membrane for TES 3
1.42 Factor of Safety in the membrane for TFS 2
1.32 Joint Factor of Safety for All Joints
d. The test specimens show no signs of delamination or
wear.
e. All test objectives were met.
Two more full-scale specimens are scheduled to be hydrotested
to 1408 of maximum expected operating pressure by the middle of
January 1984. These tests if as successful as the tests of TFS
2/3, will provide adequate certification of the FWC structural
design.
Lightweight External Tank
In last year's annual report the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel recommended that a nonlinear buckling analysis be performed
on the Lightweight xternal Tank (LWT) structure in the area of
the LH 2 tank where maximum compressive stresses are produced by
thrust from the Orbiter. This analysis has now been completed by
Martin-Michoud, and the method and assumptions have been reviewed
and approved by an independent consultant, Mr. David Bushnell, of
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company. The results show the LWT to
have a 608 margin of safety in compression above the design
ultimate load. This will add to the 26.58 margin of safety
between the design ultimate load and the design limit load. With
these analytical results in mind, the Panel is satisfied the LWT
is structurally stable for 1098 of SSM rated power level.
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Landing Gear Design
For many yeare the ASAP has been pointing out the
inconsistency of the landing gear design loads where the Orbiter
has departed from commercial design practice. Normal commercial
transport aircraft have built-in margins for the maximum loads
expected in landing and braked roll-out conditions since the
critical loads are normally refused take-off with braking and a
1/2g turn. Thus comparison with transports show:
	
DC-9	 L-1011 orbiter
Max design load equals max stress
(% max stress)	 1008	 1008	 --
Braked roll-out (8 max stress) 	 738	 588	 1008
Touchdown at loft/sec (8 max stress) 718	 348	 --
	
5ft/sec (8 max stress) --	 1008
Static load (8 max stress) 	 48.48	 218	 38.78
Tire deflection (max Ldg Load)	 338	 --	 668	 P
In spite of the fact that brake energy (design) has been
based on abort landings at 240,000 lbs. there have been actual or
incipient brake failures on almost every landing even though
landing weights have not yet approached the design maximum valve.
A review of the brake energy utilized through STS-5 shows that
the pilots have been demanding ever increasing energy. STS-5
used an average of 35.54 millions of foot pounds with a maximum
on one wheel of 42.62 millions of foot pounds. This value
compares to the maximum energy for emergency use of 55 million
foot-pounds and a fuse setting of 42 million foot-pounds,
illustrating the marginal capacity of the brakes.
l
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It has been noted by Robert Rothi that the brake pedals
require a 75 N force to achieve maximum brake pressure of 1500
psi. This apparently is extremely difficult for the pilot to do
consistently because of the long, tiring mission and not applying
full force lengthens the stopping distance appreciably.
	 Here is
a PRIME situation to incorporate an "autobrake" system.
Autobrakes are currently in production use on the 747, DC-10,
DC-9, and other airplanes and the systems have been
well-developed. Adaptation for use on the Shuttle should be a
simple process and would relieve crew workload and result in
shorter, consistent stopping distances.
The brakes were initially designed for 3000 psi, but the
torque from the carbon-carbon rubbing surfaces peaked so high
near the end of the stop on dynamometer tests that B. F.
Goodrich, the brake supplier, was afraid of structurally failing
the stators and rotors. Hence, the addition of reducers and the 	 1
	
reduction of maximum brake pressure to 1500 psi to limit the peak 	 {
torque.
Repeating again some of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
recommendations, it is suggested that NASA:
w
a. Seriously study the use of a longer nose gear strut
or the installation of an expanding nose gear strut
jto relieve the roll-out loads in landing,
b. Similarly study the feasibility of a 4-wheel truck
main gear.
Short of such a major change there are a number of less
extensive improvements that NASA should seriously address
including:
a.
	
	
Place the Shuttle main gear tires on a flat surface
on individual load cells at the end of a mission
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and record variation in load distribution across
the Shuttle. It appears that structural
deflections on landing must tilt the shock struts
outward loading up the inboard tires to higher
loads and causing those brakes to absorb more than
i
their proper share of the energies.
b.	 Move the main tire centerline inward toward the
shock strut about one inch and increase the tire
size as much as the diametral clearances will
allow, maybe H46x17-22, or bigger, with a 5 o
 bead
seat.
C.	 With the larger tire and internal wheel space
redesign the brake for greater energy and torque
capacity using structural carbon. Support the
brake on the axle near the inboard bearing to
minimize axle bending.
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APPENDIX 7
PANEL ACTIVITIES FOR CY 1983
As in previous years, Panel fact-finding sessions have been
conducted on the average of four times per month for 1983.
Members and consultants have during this same period visited
seven NASA centers and facilities (Ames Research Center, Dryden
Flight Research Center, Langley Research Center, Lewis Research
Center, Johnson Space Center, Marshall Space Flight Center,
Kennedy Space Center) a6 well as NASA Headquarters, and numerous
NASA contractors. Although these have been focused on the Space
Transportation Svstem, there have been a number of fact-finding
visits aimed at reviewing and assessing aeronautical operations
and attendant flight safety. The Panel has, where practical,
participated in a number of significant in-house reviews; e.g.,
Flight Readiness Reviews, various project hardware/software 	 1
technical meetings, STS Support Activities. Pane! efforts have
been supported by the Panel Staff Director through in-depth and
I	 continuous participation and reviewing of STS and other 	 i
i	 program/project activities as well as aeronautical R&D and
administrative flight safety activities.
The breadth of Panel personal discussions goes from the NASA
Administrator and Deputy Administrator to Program Directors on
into the subsystem design and test personnel (the "hands-on"
people). Be; r ond this is the Panel's annual report provided to
the NASA Administrator, informal meetings with Congressional
staffs, and testimony before the appropriate House and Senate
subcommittees in January-March period. Where requested, the
Panel provides individual support to special review teams such as
those looking at the Filament Wound Case for the Solid Rocket
Motor, Centaur/Shuttle Safety, and the Shuttle Main Engine
Assessment Group.
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APPENDIX 7 CONTINUED
.0,
SUBJECT: Panel Fact-Finding Sessions Calendar year 1983
Date	 Location
	
Attendance/Subject
1/28-29/83 KSC STS-6 Flight Readiness
Firing
	
(Elverum/Grier)
2/4/83 Rocketdyne Div. STS-6 Flight Readiness
Firing	 (Elverum/Grier)
2/8/83 NASA HQ Annual Meeting,	 1982
Activities	 (Panel)
2/22/83 Hercules Corp. SRM Filament Wound Case
(Hedrick/Rothi)
3/2/83 Congress,	 DC Panel Testimony to House of
Representatives
3/3/83 KSC STS-6 Flight Readiness
Review	 (Battin/Grier)
3/16-17/83 KSC Launch Processing
Software/Hardware	 (Battin)
3/30/83 JSC STS Program
Management/Mission Ops
(Hawkins/Grier)
4/4-8/83 JSC Mission ops,	 aircraft
safety,	 logistics for STS,
Logistics Panel, Space
Medicine	 (Parmet/Davis)
4/6/83 Rockwell, CA Integrated Logistics Panel,
Orbiter	 (McDonald)
4/14-15/83 General Dynamcis Shuttle/Centaur Level II
Reviews	 (Hawkins/Grier)
4/19-20/83 MSFC STS Projects	 (SSME,	 ET,
SRB),	 Spacelab,
	
Space
Telescope, Filament Wound
Case	 (Panel)
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4/21/83 NASA HQ STS Logistics
Programs/Policy
	 (McDonald)
4/27-30/83 Rockwell, CA Space Shuttle Main
Engine/Orbiter (Himmel)
5/25-26/83 NASA HQ TDRSS Ops,
	 Orbital
Communications
(Battin/Davis)
5/31-6/1/83 JSC STS Autoland,
	
Flight
Trajectories	 (Battin)
6/?-2/83 JSC STS Autoland,	 RTLS abort,
Crew Support	 (Davis)
6/2-3/83 JSC Spacelab Safety Review
(Parmet)
6/8-9/83 Hercules Corp Filament Wound Case
Status/Problems
(Hedrick/Rothi)
6/10/83 NASA HQ STS-7 Flight Readiness
Review	 (Himmel)
6/14-16/83 KSC Special SSME Management
Review Team (Himmel)
6/27-30/83 ARC Aviation Safety Inspection
Review Autoland Simulator
operation	 (Davis)
7/12-1.3/83 General Dynamics STS/Centaur Integration and
Ops	 (Panel)
7/14/83 Rocketdyne Div Space Shuttle -lain Engine
(Elverum/Himmel)
7/25-28/83 LaRC Aircraft operational safety
(Davis)
8/11-14/83 JSC Orbital Refueling Test
Program (Parmet)
8/23-24/83 MSFC Technical Interchange
Meeting,	 FWC	 (Hedrick)
9/14/83 Martin Marietta, Manned Maneuvering Unit
(Hawkins)
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9/13-15/83 NASA HQ Intercenter Aircraft
Operations Panel and NASA
Aircraft Operations
(Parmet/Davis)
9/28-30/83 KSC Launch Preparations, Shuttle
Processing Contractor
transition,
	
Aircraft Ops
(Panel)
10/7/83 JSC STS-1 to -8 Biomedical
Symposium (Parmet)
10/18-19/83 JSC Shuttle/Centaur Fluid
Systems Safety Review RTG
power supply cooling/control
(Elverum)
10/19-20/83 MSFC Filament Wour.d Case
Technical Interchange
Review/Meeting	 (Rothi)
10/19-20/83 VAFB Integrated Logistics Panel
for STS	 (McDonald,)
10/18/83 Congress,	 DC Informal meetings with
Senate Staff	 (Hawki.;s/Grier)
11/8-10/83 JSC Manned Maneuvering Unit
Critical Design Review
Orbiter Brakes, Crew
Operations	 (Rothi/Davis)
11/10/83 MSFC SSME,	 ET, SRB Production
Quality Readiness Review
with contractors/government
(Grier)
11/16/83 JSC Orbital Refueling System
Safety Review (Parmet)
11/18/83 Brooks AFB, TX EVA medical status and
testing	 (Parmet)
11/18/83 NASA HQ STS-9 Flight Readiness
Review (Himmel)
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11/30/83 Rocketdyne,	 Div SSME 1098 Rated Power Level
Status	 (Hawkins/Grier)
12/2/83 KSC Shuttle Processing
Contractor's Status
(Stewart)
12/6/83 NASA HQ Orbital Maneuverinq Vehicle,
Transfer Orbit Stage,
Tethered Satellite and its
operation:.,	 inertial Upper
Stage status,	 activities
review	 (Pane].)
12/13/83 Nat'l Res Council Filament Wound Case Special
Committee Meeting	 (Roth)
12/16/83 Le RC Centaur Critical Design
Review (Himmel)
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Appendix 8
PLANS FOR 1984
Panel Membership
A number of Panel membership changes are taking place at this
time occasioned by events in late 1983. As noted in the front of
this report, Robert D. Rothi's passing requires the selection of a
new member. Lt. General Leighton I. Davis completed his membership
term and has been retained as a consultant to the Aerospace Safety
Advisory Panel. Bob Rothi had taken General Davis' position on the
Panel. As a result of the selection of the contractor team which
included Lockheed and Grumman to perform Space Shuttle Launch and
Landing processing at Kennedy Space Center and Vandenberg Air Force
Baso both Willis M. Hawkins and Ira Grant Hedrick have retired from
the Panel. They are remaining with the Panel in a phase-over
period to accomplish a smooth transition to new members recently
appointed in their stead.	 j
Mr. John C. Brizendine former President of the Douglas Aircraft	
I
Company, now an aerospace consultant, has been selected to succeed
Willis Hawkins as the new Chairman of the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel. A brief resume follows:
John Brizendine completed 33 years with the Douglas
Aircraft Company in May 1983 after trying his hand at
teaching at the University of Kansas after college
graduation. His career included flight test work on a
series of high performance research and develop.nent,
military and commercial, aircraft. This culminated in his
promotion to Executive Vice President and then President
of Douglas Aircraft Company in 1973. John served in the
Navy as a Naval Aviator with single and mulit-engine
ratings.
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Mr. Charles J. Donlan has been selected to fill the vacancy
left by Grant Hedrick. A brief resume follows:
Charles Donlan had 37 years experience in research and
development activities with NASA and its predecessor NACA
before retiring in 1976. Most of this time was spent at
Langley Research Center with the last 8 years spent at
NASA Headquarters. Since leaving NASA he has been a
consultant to the Institute for Defense Analysis with
emphasis on assessing and making recommendations to the
DoD on the development of facilities for the space Shuttle
operations. His NASA/NACA experience included high speed
{{{ research aircraft programs and direct involvement with all
aspects of manned space flight since the beginning of such
programs.
The selection of a candidate to fill the remaining membership
position will be made in the very near future.
Panel Activities in 1984
Plans are to continue to focus on a number of aspects of the
Space Transportation System as it approaches full operational
status, assess the safety implications of upper stages and
payloads that interface with the STS and to monitor the safety
procedures and practices of NASA's aircraft operations.
Efforts will include at least the following areas of interest
and concern:
o	 Shuttle Processing Contractor progress
o	 STS logistics and associated operational
I
implementation
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- Orbiter
- SSME
- Solid Rocket Boosters
- External Tank
Launch Processing System at KSC and VAFB
Vandenberg Air Force Base operations and
relationships with KSC
Upper stages including the Inertial Upper Stage,
Centaur, Transfer Orbit Stage, Orbital Maneuvering
System
Filament Wound Case for the STS Solid Rocket Motor
Payloads and on-board experiments and their
integration into the CTS, for example:
- Refueling Experiment
- Spacelab
- Tethered Satellite System
- Galileo
- Space Telescope
Extravehicular Activity (EVA) and its support
systems including suits, manned maneuvering systems
and .life sciences
c	 Rendezvous and proximity operations in space
o	 The Solar Maximum Mission spacecraft repair flight
o	 Space Station
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o	 Certification policy and its implementation
including product quality and design suitability,
as well as, use of analyses versus tests
o	 Operational procedures to promote safety in the
STS, space station and other programs
o	 Safety of NASA aircraft operations
41
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AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY
PANEL
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVISORY PANEL
CHAIRMAN
Mr. Willis M. Hawkins (Retiring Chairman)
Senior Advisor Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Mr. John C. Brizendine (Incoming Chairman)
Formerly President, Douglas Aircraft Company
MEMBERS
Dr. Richard H. Battin
Associate Department Head
Charles Stark Draper Lab. Inc.
Mr. Charles J. Donlan
Formerly, Deputy Associate Adminstrator for
Manned Space Flight NASA
Mr. Gerard W. Elverum, Jr.
Vice President-General Manager
TRW Space and Technology Group
Mr. Herbert E. Grier
Formerly, Senior Vice President
EG&G Inc.
Mr. Ira Grant Hedrick (Retiring Member)
Presidential Assistant for Corporate Technolgy
Grumman Aerospace Corporation
Mr. John F. McDonald
Formerly, Vice President-Technical
TigerAir, Inc.
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Mr. Norman R. Parmet
Formerly, Vice President
Trans World Airlines
Mr. Robert D. Rothi (deceased)
Formerly, Chief Design Engineer
Douglas Aircraft Company
Mr. John G. Stewart
Assistant General Manager
Tennessee Valley Authority
CONSULTANTS
Lt. Gen. Leighton I. Davis
USAF (Ret.)
Dr. Seymour C. Himmel
Formerly, Associate Director,
Lewis Research Center i
EX-OFFICIO MEMBER
Y;
Dr. Milton A. Silveria
NASA Chief Engineer
NASA Headquarters
STAFF
Mr. Gilbert L. Roth
Staff Director, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
i
Ms. Susan Webster
Advisory Committee Assistant
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ACRONYMS G ABBREVIATIONS
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i
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I
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
AMO Aircraft Management Office
ASAP Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel
ASKA Automatic Systems for Kinematic Analysis
DFI Development Flight Instrumentation
EVA Extravehicular Activity
FASCOS Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
FAMOS Flight Acceleration Monitor Only System
FRR Flight Readiness Reviews
FPL Full Power Level
HUD Heads Up Display
ILP Integrated Logistics Panel
IAOP Intercenter Aircraft Operations Panel
IUS Inertial Upper Stage
ILS Integrated L;.)gistics Support
JSC Johnson Space Center
KSC Kennedy Space Center
LPS Launch Processing System
LWT Light Weight Tank
LRU Line Replaceable Units
LaRC Langley Research Center
Le RC Lewis Research Center
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
MMU Manned Maneuvering Unit
NACA National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NSTS National Space Transportation System
OMI OperatS.t.ns and Maintenance Instructions
OV Orbiter Vehicle
PAM Payload Assist Module
PIO Pilot Induced Oscillation
RPL Rated Power Level
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RHC Rotational Hand Controller
SMM Solar Maximum Mission
SPC Shuttle Processing Contract(or)
SRM Solid Rocket Motor
SSMB Shuttle System Main Engine
STS Space Transportation System
TDRSS Tracking Data Relay Satelite System
USAF United States Air Force
VAFB Vandenberg Air Force Base
VMS Vertical Motion Simulator
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